Paper 1 OPVL

1)

Source 1, Chapter 5: "The Great Fatherland War" from the Longman "Global War" book is a brief chapter from a British textbook meant for high school history students. Its purpose is to give a thorough overview of the German attack of Russia in World War II -- What Hitler's motivation for attack was; the details of Operation Barbarossa, Germany's plan for attacking Russia; and the Russian defense and how Russia ultimately drove Germany out. The source has value for learning about the invasion of Russia because it is from a reliable source; it is a textbook that is used in a number of schools, so it can be assumed that it is accurate. It was written from a British perspective, which could be a value because Britain was directly involved in World War II; America was involved, but in a far more disconnected way than European countries whose lands were threatened and people entrenched in the effects of war, so a British text might be more "real" than an American one. However, the British origin could also be a limitation, as Britain was fighting against Germany in WWII. Leftover resentment from the war might have colored the depiction of German actions more than if it were an American text; it certainly seems to present the story in a way that favors the USSR more than Germany. Another limitation is that the text doesn't really offer any different interpretations of why Germany had to back out. It gives a fairly balances view, citing Stalin's "scorched earth" methods and the weather and conditions; but there are probably many more things that affected Germany's failure too, such as leadership and the planning of Operation Barbarossa. Altogether, it is a fairly reliable text that gives very good basics of the situation, but it is only meant to give an overview, not a complete understanding of the situation.

Why Nations Go to War is a book on the major wars of the 20th century, analyzing how and why they happened, by historian John Stoessinger. Its purpose is to analyze different interpretations of why certain nations went to war with each other and educate the reader about these things, analyze why the wars took the courses they did, and even to question modern history through the spectrum of the past. Of course, the purpose of any book is also to sell copies, and to present the author's opinion on the subject. This source has value because Stoessinger, its author, is a highly respected historian. It also has value because it very thoroughly goes through what happened, with dates and events and names, so that the reader gets a very accurate view of the events as they happened. It also goes into more detail with the prelude to the attack, and how Stalin allowed the invasion to happen when he has fair warning. However, the chapter is written from a more psychological viewpoint, and so it represents a certain view -- the author's view, which is only an interpretation. Positivist historians would say that this is not history at all, because it isn't just the straight presentation of historical facts -- rather it attempts to give the motivations that can only be speculated about. Because this chapter focuses on what Hitler's personal motivations and psychology might have been, it doesn't present the most balanced viewpoint of the situation because the truth might be that Hitler's personal motivations (the desire to completely crush Russia, not just to continue building his Reich) might not have been as big a factor as Stoessinger speculates.


2)

Both sources claim that inclement weather was certainly a reason that Hitler's armies failed to win the war in Russia. Both of them detail the circumstances -- Hitler's army was unprepared for the harsh Russian winters. The torrential rain that turned the fields to mud and slowed the army down, the freezing temperatures dropped to -40 degress Farenheit, and the failure of the German army's weapons to work in the frigid climate were all factors that inhibited them, and caused Hitler to lose many men. Both sources also claim that the USSR was saved in part by its manpower and the peoples' resistance. The cruelty of the German soldiers compelled the Russian people to become Partisans, or members of resistance groups, which made fighting for the Germans significantly more difficult. Both sources also seem to both imply that Stalin's awareness that by signing the Soviet-Nazi Treaty was only buying him time might have at least been helpful. He didn't expect Germany not to attack, and he also didn't heed the warnings of Britain and the U.S. While this was also a reason that Hitler was able to attack, Stalin was at least aware that attack might be coming.

The Stoessinger source is different from the textbook source in that it also offers more in-depth psychological insights to why Hitler's invasion of Russia failed. One of these is a sort of miscalculation theory, that Hitler didn't know what he was getting himself into. This is seen in his failure to equip his troops properly, assuming he would have a quick summer victory. Because of this miscalculations, when the Russian winter came, the men were much more succeptible to the elements. Although the Russian winter theory was explored in the other source, it didn't discuss why it was that the men were so ill-prepared for Russian war, and does not attribute it to Hitler's miscalculation. A general view explored in the Stoessinger source that was not even mentioned in Chapter 5 of the Global War text was that the reason for Hitler's failure is that his deep desire to destroy Russia blinded him to the reality of situations. He thought that Russia was far more of a threat than it was, or than it could realistically be, so he did not consult with people who knew better, or listen to them, and charged into war with a fear disproportionate to the actual threat. An aspect of Hitler's failure that has great significance attributed to it in the Chapter 5 source and is not even mentioned in the Stoessinger source is Stalin's "scorched-earth" method. One of the most important effects of this was that the Soviet weapons factories were outside of German reach, as well as other important factories such as textiles for clothing, ammunition, and transport. Because of the removal of factories to far-away places, the Germans weren't able to take supplies from the Russians, and only had what they were supplied -- clearly not enough for a victory.